explicitly examines borrowing behavior during this period. Although subnational governments in the United States avoided potentially large deficits through a combination of substantial spending reductions and modest (in most states) tax increases during this recession, these governments continued to issue bonds to finance new debt and refinance existing debt, which may seem counterintuitive. Such borrowing might be expected if states borrowed to avoid deficits and/or fund stimulus policy. Alternatively, subnational governments might have restrained borrowing if there was concern about long-term balanced budgets and persistent revenue shortfalls or if the overall economic slowdown created a lower demand for public capital.
A second reason to pay special attention to this period is the dramatic changes that occurred in several aspects of municipal bond finance. Perhaps of greatest interest is the fact that state and local governments possessed the ability for a limited period to issue Build America Bonds (BABs). Available only between April 2009 and December 2010, BABs were bonds in which interest paid to borrowers counted as taxable income, but whose issuers received a direct federal government subsidy of 35 percent of their interest payments. 2 Although there have been proposals for the use of subsidized taxable state-local bonds (Galper and Peterson, 1973) , this was the first broad application available to all state and local governments in the United States.
Third, market conditions were unique during this period. Interest rates in general, and those applying in particular to state and local bonds, reached historic lows during the Great Recession due to the policies of the Federal Reserve. Not only did the level of interest rates decline, but the rates paid by municipal borrowers relative to those paid by the Treasury and corporate borrowers also fluctuated substantially. Furthermore, as Ely (2012) notes, the use of bond insurance by state and local governments fell substantially during and after the financial market crisis, which some might expect to affect borrowing behavior. Changes in the insurance market for bonds were a result of the severity of the recession, the general decline in interest costs, changes in credit rating practices, and even the opportunity offered by BABs. Clearly this was an unusual time for financial markets. Although all of these factors make this an especially interesting time to study state and local debt, they also complicate the analysis.
The research that follows provides more recent evidence for the differences among states in annual borrowing by subnational governments. A statistical analysis presents evidence about the demographic, economic, political, and institutional factors that influenced interstate differences in borrowing during the Great Recession, supplementing existing empirical findings about why some states use more subnational debt than others.
The remainder of the paper is divided into seven sections. The next section offers a broad description of state and local debt in the United States from 1992 to 2007. Section III describes subnational government borrowing at the time of the Great Recession. In Section IV, we formulate and estimate a regression model drawing on the relevant literature on what determines differences in state and local bond issues, state institutional and financial procedures that influence bond borrowing costs, and the limited research already conducted on Build America Bonds. Section V presents the regression results, while Section VI concludes with a brief summary and some policy implications.
II. State and LocaL Government debt before the Great receSSIon
To put subnational government borrowing in the United States between 2008 and 2010 in context, it is useful to review the previous status of such debt. 3 In 2007, state and local governments had accumulated financial market debt of nearly $2.5 trillion, or about $8,300 per person. This subnational debt amounted to about 17 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and nearly 79 percent of the annual revenue collected by all state and local governments in the country. From 1992 to 2007, state and local government debt increased relative to both population and GDP, but did not increase relative to the total revenue of state and local governments. In 2007, before the effects of the recession, aggregate state and local government debt amounted to about 79 percent of state and local revenue, roughly the same level as in 1992 and 1997. Comparing fiscal years 1997 and 2007 seems appropriate as both came after a period of rapid economic growth. Thus, as of 2007, state and local governments in aggregate had not incurred outstanding debt historically disproportionate to their annual budgets.
Annual interest payments on the outstanding debt of subnational governments in the United States decreased as a share of revenue from 1992 to 2007 for all types of state and local governmental units except for school districts, where interest payments as a share of revenue remained roughly constant. Most of the increase in state and local debt between 1992 and 2007 was long-term debt for public purposes, especially debt incurred by K-12 school districts. School district long-term debt increased from 6 percent of total state and local long-term debt in 1992 to 13 percent in 2007.
III. overvIew of SubnatIonaL borrowInG durInG the Great receSSIon
Figure 1 lists state and local government bond issues by year for 2005 through 2011. In this figure state and local issues are combined but separated into the categories of short-term bonds (with a maturity date of less than one year), long-term bonds (excluding Build America Bonds), and BABs. Aggregate state and local government debt is examined, rather than the debt incurred by state governments alone, as the latter offers misleading comparisons across the states. States differ dramatically in the degree to which the state or its local governments take responsibility for generating revenue, providing public services, and issuing debt. Some state government authorities incur debt on behalf of their local governments whereas in other states, local governments are responsible for incurring debt directly. In some states, local governments can only incur debt after approval of the state government. In every state, state governments distribute state revenue to local governments in the form of intergovernmental grants that differ widely in magnitude. These factors suggest legal, economic, and political links between the fiscal behavior of a state government and its local governments that differ in every state; accordingly, when making interstate comparisons of debt issuance we consider the combined state and local government sector as a single entity.
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Focusing only on long-term debt (including Build America Bonds), new issues declined substantially in 2008 (the first year of the Great Recession and a period with substantial uncertainty in the financial markets). Subsequently, the volume of long-term bonds (including BABs) issued by state and local governments rose in both 2009 and 2010. In terms of the total bond volume, 2010 was similar to 2007 (the year prior to the financial market crisis and start of the Great Recession Figure 1 also illustrates that real long-term borrowing by state and local governments decreased dramatically in 2011. One possible explanation is the moving up of planned 2011 capital projects, and the associated borrowing to finance them, to 2010 due to the availability of Build America Bonds. A second possibility is that state and local governments were being exceptionally cautious in the aftermath of the recession and the uncertain fiscal situation that still existed. As shown convincingly in Figure 2 , interstate differences in per capita borrowing over the three-year period of 2008 through 2010 were substantial, varying from about $7,400 per capita in New York to less than $1,200 per capita in Montana. Such variance indicates that population alone is not enough to standardize a comparison of borrowing among the states. Furthermore, although some states with relatively high per capita debt in 2007 (such as New York and Massachusetts) were relatively heavy borrowers in the three years that followed, others with relatively high per capita debt (such as Rhode Island) were not. Table 1 provides a comparison for all states of each specific state's share of the national total of subnational long-term bond issues during 2008 through 2010 and each state's share of national total outstanding debt (the result of past long-term bond issues) in 2007. Table 2 provides a similar perspective, but only for BABs. The last column in Table  1 displays the ratio of the 2008 to 2010 percentages of a state's new subnational bond issues relative to all states divided by the percentage of the same state's outstanding debt in 2007 relative to all states. In this last column, a ratio greater than one indicates that subnational governments in that state made relatively more use of borrowing during the 2008 to 2010 period than they had in a previous long-run period. For the 20 or so states at both ends of the distribution, the differences are substantial. For instance, the relative borrowing of New Mexico, Nebraska, Utah, Hawaii, and Iowa from 2008 to 2010 (relative to the aggregate borrowing of all states) was at least 25 percent greater than past borrowing as reflected by relative outstanding debt in 2007. There are several possible explanations for the pattern of interstate variation observed in Figure 2 and Table 1 . One possibility is that because borrowing for capital expenditures in a state 5 A sample comment reflecting this view is "… a newfound sense of fiscal austerity gripped state and local governments and that discouraged any willingness to take on additional debt …" ("2011 in Statistics," The Bond Buyer, New York, NY, http://www.bondbuyer.com/specialreports).
figure 2
Per or a local government may not happen uniformly over time (i.e., it is "lumpy"), the 2008 to 2010 period is not representative of the long-run situation for any given state.
In that case, the data simply represent those states that were borrowing heavily during this period. However, because these borrowing data cover a three-year period and are aggregated for all subnational governments in each state, the level of aggregation may sufficiently offset the "lumpy" nature of borrowing and suggest correctly whether state behavior in this period was different than in the past.
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In Bahl and Duncombe (1993) defined a state's debt burden as the total amount of a particular form of debt issued at a point in time in a state divided by the state's total personal income for the previous year. For three years (1988, 1989, and 1990 ) and 49 states (Alaska was deemed an outlier and excluded), they gathered inflation-adjusted data for: (1) total state and local debt; (2) state and local government public-purpose debt; (3) full faith and credit state and local government public-purpose debt; and (4) public non-guaranteed debt. They hypothesized that differences in these values were due to four general factors: (1) service demand differences accounted for by population and income differences; (2) expansionary government differences controlled for with per-capita spending in different expenditure categories and state debt limitations; (3) debt mix as measured by private or public non-guaranteed debt as a fraction of total debt; and (4) the historic debt burden from 1977. Bahl and Duncombe find that population, population density, historic debt burden, and current government expenditure exert a positive influence on most of the measures of current debt used in their analysis. In contrast, the use of private purpose debt and a debt limit exert a negative influence.
Trautman (1995) provided a regression analysis of pooled 1984, 1985 , and 1986 data on real, per-capita, long-term debt issued by the 50 states. She was interested specifically in the effect of debt limitation rules on the issuance of debt, but included other political and institutional factors expected to influence state debt activity. Additional factors included the degree of decentralization in state and local government, use of a capital budget, executive tenure remaining, executive appointment power, and the number of state public authorities authorized to issue debt. Furthermore, she accounted for the expected effect of service demand differences by including as explanatory variables the percentage of the state population in urban areas, percentage who are college educated, percentage greater than age 65, and the state per-capita income. Her findings suggest that debt management and strong executive control reduce the level of state debt. Clingermayer and Wood (1995) hypothesized that the observed differences in debt levels are due to economic, political, and institutional factors. Economic factors measured only in the year in which debt is observed include real per-capita income, real per-capita own source state and local revenues, and real per-capita federal revenue. Economic factors measured in the year debt is observed and for the previous nine years include the change in the three previously described economic factors, and the change in short-term debt. Two additional economic variables include an interest rate measure across years and a dummy variable to account for the 1986 federal tax reform. Political and institutional explanatory variables included are: (1) real federal debt; (2) a measure of political liberalism in the state; (3) the degree of electoral competition in the state; (4) the degree of divided government in the state; (5) fiscal centralization as measured by the ratio of state government revenue to all state and local revenues; (6) a dummy variable if a tax or spending limit is in place; and (7) a dummy variable if a debt limit is in place. The economic factors included as explanatory variables in the Clingermayer and Wood regression study are statistically significant and of the expected sign. They find the presence of tax and spending limits in a state is associated with greater per capita debt levels. Ellis and Schansberg (1999) examined the reasons why the change in real long-term debt levels (rather than the level analyzed in the previously cited studies) varies across states with a regression study that weights this measure by either a state's population or its total subnational government spending. They also believe that economic, political, institutional, and constituency factors influence the state differences. Ellis and Schansberg find that a higher percentage of young (old) people in the population exert a positive (negative) influence on both measures of a state's change in debt level, whereas per-capita income exerts a positive influence on change in debt per capita and a negative influence on change in debt per government spending. Only a few of the included political and institutional explanatory variables exerted a statistically significant influence on either debt measure.
There is also a large financial market literature regarding whether institutional arrangements and procedural borrowing rules affect borrowing costs. In an often-cited paper, Poterba and Reuben (1999) found that tax limits increase, and expenditure limits decrease, state borrowing costs. They also report that constitutional anti-deficit provisions and explicit debt limits lower borrowing costs, although these effects are weaker than the more general tax/expenditure limits. These results contrast to the work on outstanding state debt described above, which is less consistent in finding a fiscal limit effect. There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. It may be that any borrowing cost savings from fiscal limits simply are not great enough to overwhelm other state factors encouraging debt. Or it might be that binding tax and expenditure limits encourage some subnational governments to increase debt finance of capital projects relative to tax finance. Regardless, it seems important to include measures of statewide fiscal limits, although the expectations about the effects of those limits are not clear.
A second relevant element of the financial market literature examines state borrowing procedures, including whether an issue is competitively priced or negotiated, whether a state provides a pooling mechanism (such as a bond bank) for small issuers, and the management experience and capacity of state-local officials who are responsible for borrowing and managing debt. One problem with incorporating the use of specific explanatory variables from this literature into our work is that they are usually issue specific (such as maturity and whether the sale is competitive) and thus not directly applicable to an interstate study. However, following Robbins and Kim (2003) , we have collected data on whether states operate bond banks to lower borrowing costs for local issuers. In addition, since the literature suggests that management capacity and the overall volume of borrowing may lower borrowing costs, a number of studies use population as a proxy for both. Issue size also seems to have a nonlinear effect on borrowing costs, initially declining and then rising. These factors provide a rationale for including past debt as an independent variable. If past debt is relatively large, this indicates substantial borrowing experience and magnitude of issues, both of which are found in the previous literature to lower borrowing costs.
Given the short time that has passed since the use of Build America Bonds, there exists only a limited literature regarding their use. An analysis by The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2011) shows that BAB issues tended on average to be larger and to have longer maturities than traditional municipal bond issues. The Treasury report also confirms our findings that subnational governments in all states issued at least some Build America Bonds, and use among states was highly variable. In addition, the Treasury analysis and Ang, Bhansali, and Xing (2010) show that the existence of BABs lowered borrowing costs for subnational governments in comparison to traditional, non-taxable municipal bonds. The Treasury and Ang, Bhansali, and Xing analyses shows interest rate savings on a 30-year Build America Bond to be around 84 (54) basis points lower than a traditional municipal bond. As expected, this occurred because the BABs' direct federal subsidy rate of 35 percent was set equal to the highest federal personal and corporate marginal income tax rates, thus attracting new investors.
9 However, the effects were not uniform. Both analyses report that the issue cost savings from BABs compared to traditional municipal bonds increased with the maturity of the bond. In addition to discussing the different administrative procedures required for issuing Build America Bonds, Luby (2012) described two case studies of bond sales in Ohio that compared the issue costs of traditional non-taxable bonds and Build America Bonds. Even after accounting for the increased cost of underwriting in comparison to traditional bonds, BABs yielded cost savings of between 6 and 60 basis points. 
b. regression model
We have data on the dollar amount of long-term cumulative debt previously issued and the dollar value of bond issues in a state. Thus, we assume that the unobserved desired amount of long-term cumulative debt (D) in period "t" is achieved based upon the observed amount of debt in period "t-1" plus the observed issuance of new longterm bonds (B) in period "t" less the unobserved retirement (R) of existing long-term bonds in period "t", or Because we do not know desired debt in period "t", and information on bond retirements by state is not easily obtained in a publicly available and comparable data set, we assume that D* is accounted for by the four general causal factors discovered throughout our previously described review of the literature. We also assume that differences in R* across the states are accounted for by differences in borrowing costs. This yields a reduced form regression that explains bond issuance in a year by previous total longterm debt, factors that drive the demand for public services in that year, and the relative cost of borrowing in that year, or An insight from this modeling exercise is the need to account for differences in nationally determined borrowing costs in each year through a set of year dummies. We obtained long-term debt issuance by state through personal correspondence with an analyst at Thomson Reuters (TR).
11 12 These data include information on new bond 11 We chose to specifically look at only fiscal years that overlapped with the occurrence of the Great Recession. The reason for doing this was twofold. First to only gather empirical results for this unique fiscal period so they could be compared to results from previous periods in the United States, and second because the required data on state-specific debt issuance had to be collected privately. The inclusion of explanatory variables that account for all of these factors helps to insure that our regression analysis does not suffer from omitted variable bias. It is also necessary to avoid or account for the inclusion of endogenous explanatory variables. We use one-year lagged values of Real Federal Intergoverment Revenue Per Capita, State Fiscal Balance Percentage of Expend, and Real Total Debt Per Capita. If we instead used the values for these explanatory variables from the same fiscal year as of comparable information for 2009 and 2010. It is reasonable to inquire about differences in the Census and TR annual data, especially given that our prior work about aggregate state-local debt (rather than annual borrowing) utilized the information from the Census Bureau. At the time of the writing, Census had released data for 2009, but not for 2010. Therefore, we compared the data for annual long-term bond issues by state reported by Census for 2008 and 2009 to the TR data used in our analysis, but only for the years 2008 and 2009. The simple correlation coefficient between the two series for total bond issues is 0.99. For per capita bond issues it is 0.85. One jurisdiction where there is a substantial difference between the series is the District of Columbia, but we exclude DC from our state-based regression analysis. In terms of reflecting interstate differences in subnational government bond issue, the two data sources are quite comparable. 13 These data do not differentiate issues for private purposes. For a detailed examination of the differences in debt for private and public purposes, see Temple (1993) .
the dependent variables, they would reasonably need to be considered endogenously determined and a two-stage regression technique would have to be used. 14 Using the lagged values is desirable from the theoretical perspective that policymakers issue debt in a given fiscal year with only full knowledge of these lagged values and only uncertain estimates of these values for that fiscal year. In addition, we dealt with multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity in the manner described below.
The specific explanatory variables chosen to represent the five general factors in equation (3) are similar to variables used in previous studies of this type, although we Furthermore, a state budget process that involves decisions on the amount of bonds to issue in a year may in part be responsible for the state's fiscal balance as a percentage of expenditure in that year. have purposefully taken a parsimonious approach to variable choice to avoid issues associated with multicollinearity and endogeneity. We believe this to be particularly relevant regarding our choice of the Berry et al. (1998) and Berry et al. (2010) measure of the political ideology of citizens in a state to measure political influences on bond issues.
15 Table 3 provides a more detailed explanation of each variable and its source. Table 4 offers descriptive statistics for all variables used in the respective 150 and 50 observation analyses.
v. reGreSSIon reSuLtS
Tables 5 and 6 provide the regression results. 16 We experimented with non-linearity in the relationships by taking the natural log of dependent variables, but found greater statistical significance through the inclusion of quadratic forms of explanatory variables when the simple linear form was statistically insignificant.
17 Table 6 contains two sets of reduced form regression results (that use the single cross section data set with 50 observations) for the Real BAB Debt Issues Per Capita and Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita dependent variables. These regressions contain the same explanatory variables used in the full 150 data set regressions contained in Table  5 but allow us to see differences in the influences of these explanatory variables for BAB-specific issues and for traditional issues in 2010 when BABs existed as an alternative form of debt financing that was not available in 2008 and 2009. In addition, in Table 6 we include a second Real BAB Debt Issues Per Capita regression that includes 15 Note that we also tried the specific ideological and political institution measures used by previous research to capture these political influences but never found any one measure (or group of measures) as statistically significant as this measure, which is widely used by political scientists to capture difference in liberal to political conservative ideology across the states. 16 Because we have explanatory variables that do not vary over the three 50 state cross-sections of data, we could not utilize a fixed effects estimation procedure. Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita as an additional explanatory variable. In this regression, we recognize that this explanatory variable is simultaneously determined. Thus, the use of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression estimation requires finding instrumental variables expected to influence the offering of the newly included endogenous variable in the regression, but not the dependent variable. We utilize the reasonable theory that a state's subnational governments are more likely to offer traditional debt issues the greater the income tax benefits that residents in the state can potentially enjoy from purchasing these offerings. Benefits to a state's residents come in the form of additional income tax deductibility in a state that has a higher rate of personal income taxation with a more progressive rate structure, with more high-income citizens who are more likely to pay the state's income taxes, and does not tax interest earned by an individual on a municipal bond issued within the state. 18 Under these circumstances, a Krozsner and Stratman (2000) and Nguyen-Hoang (2012)]. The R-Squared on the first-stage regression that predicted Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita was 0.939. An earlier version of this research only used the first eight instrumental variables. We followed a referee's suggestion to add instruments used in other papers, and thus employ a first-stage estimation of Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita using 50 observations and 38 regressors.
state's policymakers are likely to offer more traditional debt. 19 This logic works well for satisfying the requirement that these instruments do not influence the dependent variable that measures a state's offering of BABs because the interest earned on holding this form of debt by a state's citizens does not enjoy such tax-free status. We assessed the appropriateness of this logic through the test of over-identifying instrumental variable restrictions as described in Wooldridge (2009) , and found that we could not reject the null hypothesis that all of the 19 instruments (described in a footnote to Table 6 ) are exogenous to BAB issuance. 20 Unfortunately, measurable and available exogenous factors that drive a state's issuance of BABs but do not influence the issuance of traditional debt are not apparent. 21 Thus, we could not run the similar regression where Real BAB Debt Issues Per Capita explains Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita.
Consider first the explanatory factors found significant in the regression results recorded in Table 5 for all forms of long-term state/local debt issued in years 2008, 2009, and 2010 , and compare these findings to the ones at the disaggregated state or local level. Based on the year dummies, holding other explanatory factors constant, in 2009 there was about $378 in more Real State/Local Debt Issues Per Capita issued than in 2008 and about $321 more in 2010 than in 2008. To place this in perspective, consider that the average real amount of this aggregate debt issue per capita was about $1,000 per year. Thus, holding other explanatory factors constant, subnational governments in aggregate issued more long-term debt in the second year and third half year of the Great Recession than the first.
22 Similar patterns emerged for separate state debt issues, whereas local debt issues were no different in 2009 and 2008, but were higher in 2010. Very likely reflecting increased demand for public school infrastructure, the results in Table 5 indicate that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of a state's population that attends a K-12 public school resulted in about a $57 per capita increase in state/local bond issues in a year and a very similar $54 per capita increase for this measure for the issuance of only state bonds. The only other demographic factor that influenced local debt issuance was the ten-year population change, with a 1 percentage point rise in population resulting in about $9 more of annual local debt per person. Perhaps this is due to the more pressing need that local governments face to increase infrastructure after a population surge as compared to the state as a whole.
In the political realm, Table 5 documents that more liberal states issued both more state debt and more aggregate state/local debt per capita, with increases of about $5 and $6 in each category for every one point increase in the zero (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal) scale used. Our regression findings indicate a positive relationship between Gross State Product per capita and per capita bond issues for state-local governments together. Very interestingly, as the fiscal surplus enjoyed by a state government rose, states issued less (at an increasing rate) Real State Debt Issues Per Capita, while localities issued more (at a decreasing rate). The influence detected for aggregate state/local debt mimicked the state-only influence. A higher statewide unemployment rate of one percentage point exerted depressing influences on state debt issues per capita of about $50, and on state/local debt issues of about $65. A higher Percentage Good Roads caused states to issue more debt to maintain that status, as expected. 23 The result suggests that about a one percentage point change in good roads lead to an expected $4 increase in Real Local Debt Issues Per Capita and aggregated state/local debt issues. Perhaps it is a telling commentary on the causes of the declining quality of public infrastructure in many states that while states with more good roads issue more debt, the existence of more poor roads exerts no influence on debt issue.
The results in Table 5 also exhibit the influence of statewide institutional factors on debt issue. If a state did not restrict in any way the payment of its interest on state issued debt, local governments offered about $83 less debt per capita relative to a mean offering of $402. No limit on state debt authorization resulted in states offering $419 less in state debt per capita (relative to a mean offering of $608) and $416 less in state/local debt per capita (relative to a mean offering of $1,003). Perhaps this indicates that states with inherent difficulty in controlling their debt issues in the past (since these measures were all at least adopted a decade earlier) are more likely to adopt limitations. Interestingly, states without a limitation on their level of taxation and/or spending were less likely 23 One could argue that good roads (as measured here by pavement quality) in a state are a result of routine maintenance that is not financed through borrowing. But given the age of the roadway infrastructure in most states, maintaining a high percentage of roads in a state classified as "good" likely requires much replacement activity and hence the use of debt to finance it. Road quality also may serve as a proxy for public capital depreciation. Table 6 we report an influence of this explanatory factor for both traditional and BAB debt. We find that an increase in this lagged federal revenue led to a decrease (at an increasing rate) in a state using BABs debt in 2010. Alternatively, an increase in this federal revenue in 2009 resulted in an increase (at a decreasing rate) in a state using traditional debt in 2010. A higher state fiscal balance in the previous year as a percentage of expenditure discouraged BAB debt in the second half of 2009 and 2010. A one percentage point increase in this surplus measure yielded just over $5 less in BABs use per capita. We found that the percentage of pavement in good shape in a state's roads increased state local and state/local debt issues for the entire 2008 to 2010 period, whereas in the second half of 2009 and 2010 it only raised a state's use of BABs and did not change traditional debt issues in 2010. A state with no limit on the amount of debt it could authorize issued less state/local debt issues per capita between 2008 and 2010 and less traditional debt in 2010. However, we found this limit did not exert an influence on BABs. Finally, states with a greater lagged long-term debt again offered more traditional and BAB debt issues per capita.
Examining the last column of regression results in Table 6 , all of the same explanatory variables are statistically significant and exhibit nearly the same magnitude of influence as in the reduced form regression without Real Traditional Debt Issues Per Capita. Most important is our finding of no evidence that the issue of traditional debt by a state in 2010 had a statistically significant influence on its decision to issue Build America Bond debt. This result suggests that the choice to issue traditional non-taxable debt and Build America Bond debt was independent, implying that the separate analysis of each in the first two regressions is appropriate. We recognize some might be concerned about the instrumental variable approach used in reaching this result, but it seems important to note that the result seems robust to the use of different instruments. Estimation with a more limited set of instruments than reported here found very small substitutability (a coefficient of -0.2). Thus, it seems important to note that the fundamental result using this approach -that there is little to no substitutability between Build America Bonds and traditional non-taxable debt -is found with various sets of instruments. We discuss further the implications of this result in the conclusion.
Using the statistically significant regression results recorded in Tables 5 and 6 for the continuous explanatory variables, we have calculated elasticities in Table 7 at the mean values for each. 25 These offer a direct way to compare the influence of a particular Given the unique nature of Build America Bonds, and empirical evidence that the ability to offer BABs may have stimulated greater overall subnational borrowing, we believe it is informative to examine further the factors that drove differences in the use of BABs across the states. In Table 8 , we report the results of a regression with a dependent variable that measures a state's BAB amount as a percentage of all of its debt issuance in 2010 and uses the same explanatory variables used earlier.
A state with a higher per capita Gross State Product per person was a relatively larger user of Build America Bonds. Alternatively, states with a greater percentage of their state budget in surplus in the previous year were more likely to exhibit a smaller value of BAB Debt Percentage Total Debt. As also shown in Table 8 , we found that an increase in federal revenue sharing per person decreased (at an increasing rate) BAB debt issuance as a fraction of total debt issuance. Thus, relatively more federal revenue assistance to a state led to relatively less use of Build America Bonds. 26 As a state's percentage of total state/local spending that is local increased, the use of BABs relative to total debt decreased (at an increasing rate). Thus, relatively more decentralization in a state also led to relatively less use of Build America Bonds. 27 To put it another way, states for which the state government's subnational fiscal activity is relatively larger tended to use BABs relatively more.
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vI. Summary and PoLIcy ImPLIcatIonS
This research provides (1) a documentation of state and local government borrowing behavior during the Great Recession; (2) an examination of the response of state and local governments to the availability of Build America Bonds; and (3) explanations for interstate differences in annual long-term borrowing. The results show that a combination of demographic, economic, political, and institutional factors are important.
Perhaps the most notable result is that state and local governments continued to borrow markedly during this period of severe fiscal stress. Bond issuance in 2009 and 2010 was greater than expected after controlling for the factors influencing differences in borrowing among states. This implies that subnational governments in the United States issued debt (and presumably the public capital investment that it financed) even as the effects of the recession continued to impact those governments fiscally.
The demand for public services, and the financing of infrastructure used to provide such services, is the fundamental reason for long-term borrowing by state and local governments. The empirical analysis confirms several examples of this relationship. First, larger population states exhibit higher borrowing per person, suggesting public capital congestion. Second, per capita Gross State Product (income) is associated with greater per capita borrowing across nearly all of the forms debt issuance examined, which is expected given the evidence that most state-local public services are normal. Third, across most of our regression results, a larger fraction of the population enrolled in public schools is associated with greater per capita borrowing, particularly for state government borrowing and traditional non-taxable issues. 29 Thus, debt and the borrowing that generates it are positively influenced by a greater demand for investment in the public capital used in K-12 education. Fourth, in the regressions that explain differences in non-taxable debt and Build America Bond borrowing across the states, we find that higher quality roads are associated with greater bond volume. Finally, the evidence supports persistence in borrowing by subnational governments. Our results suggest that even though a severe recession occurred, states and localities continued to incur debt to address public infrastructure demands consistent with their past practices.
Among institutional and political factors, states with a more liberal political tendency engaged in more overall borrowing, especially borrowing by state governments. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that liberals have a greater demand for public services, including capital projects that may be financed partially with debt. Furthermore, states without an income tax borrowed less, possibly reflecting an overall lower demand for subnational government services. States with tax and/or expenditure limits borrowed more during this period, suggesting borrowing substitutes for other revenues when constrained. However, states limiting the amount of debt or interest payments tended to have more overall borrowing. Finally, the existence of a state bond bank, which could make borrowing easier or less costly for relatively small issuers, was not related to the magnitude of borrowing during this period.
The results regarding Build America Bonds are of particular interest because the availability of directly subsidized taxable municipal bonds is unusual in the United States and because the responses among the states varied so dramatically. Despite the short preparation time and the unusual character and administrative aspects of the federally initiated BABs program, many subnational governments responded aggressively. Robust results showed little substitutability between the use of traditional non-taxable bonds and use of BABs across the states, suggesting that BABs did not function completely as substitutes for traditional non-taxable debt. Thus, as intended, the availability of BABs very likely contributed to the increase in overall state-local borrowing in 2009 and 2010, a finding confirmed in regression analyses.
Among state characteristics, the results show that states with greater population, higher Gross State Product, relatively low fiscal surpluses, greater outstanding debt, and a more centralized fiscal structure tended to use Build America Bonds relatively more (issued more bonds per capita). The magnitude of Build America Bond borrowing was unaffected by either a state's political ideology or the presence of an income tax. These findings generally support the idea that larger, richer states with substantial borrowing experience and especially those without substantial surpluses used BABs to a larger degree.
There are some notable differences in the factors influencing the use of traditional non-taxable debt compared to the use of Build America Bonds. States receiving more federal aid per person were relatively larger users of traditional debt, but smaller users of BABs. The presence of more school children and a debt limit authorization positively influenced the use of traditional debt, but not BABs. In contrast, the presence of more good roads had the opposite effect of positively influencing BAB use, but not traditional debt. Given that the Build America Bonds program provided an unusual and unanticipated borrowing incentive for only a limited period, it is not surprising that state characteristics were somewhat different than for traditional long-term borrowing.
Overall, the evidence suggested by these results is consistent with the perspective that overall borrowing was not only maintained but increased during the time when the Great Recession and a financial market crisis, unmatched since the Great Depression, greatly affected state and local governments. This research suggests that the availability of Build America Bonds contributed to that increase. The evidence that state and local governments responded to the cost incentives provided by a short-term application of directly-subsidized taxable state-local bonds suggests that policymakers may want to consider this policy in the future. The evidence suggests that state and local governments did respond to the incentive of lower borrowing costs (despite fiscal constraints), and subnational governments were not confused by the taxable/direct subsidy nature of these bonds, even though they involved a very different issuing process with higher administration costs.
acknowLedGementS
The California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) and Washington Commission on State Debt (WCSD) provided funding that supported the background research for this paper. Terri Sexton (Professor of Economics at Sacramento State), and Mark Campbell, Brian Covi, and Douglas Skarr (analysts at CDIAC) offered helpful comments. We also appreciate the comments of George Zodrow, Bill Gentry, and three anonymous referees that clearly strengthened the final paper. Research assistance was provided by Hassan Enayati and Michelle Maxfield (doctoral students in economics at Michigan State University). We presented a previous version of this paper at the National Tax Association's annual research conference.
dIScLaImerS
The views offered here are ours alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of CDIAC or WCSD. Any errors that remain are our own. 
